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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL ON APPEAL:
CIVIL DOUGLAS
by STEVEN D. SCHWINN*
A fourth state criminal case came down from California, and
Justice Douglas.fora six-three majority said poor prisoners were
entitled to free counsel for their appeals. To any informed
listener it was obvious that this same rule must apply at trials and
that Betts v. Brady was about to be overruled.'
INTRODUCTION

The litigation movement to establish a categorical right to counsel at each turn
has faced a doctrinal barrier that has foiled Civil Gideon 2 agitators. That barrier is
the privilege that the United States Supreme Court has granted to the interest in
actual physical liberty. 3 In effect, the barrier demands that any litigant seeking the
right to counsel in any case, civil or criminal, must show that his or her interests
align with the fundamental, privileged interest in actual physical liberty in order to
succeed. 4 This daunting task has, predictably, yielded only spotty results something like the patchwork right to counsel in Betts v. Brady,5 certainly nothing
6
like the categorical federal constitutional right to appointed counsel in Gideon.

* Associate Professor, University of Maryland School of Law. Many thanks to my fellow
participants and to the organizers of the outstanding Edward V. Sparer Symposium on Civil Gideon.
Thanks to the staff and editors of the Temple Political and Civil Rights Law Review for their excellent
editorial work on this piece. Any errors are, of course, my own.
1. ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON's TRUMPET 186 (Random House 1970) (1964).
2. "Civil Gideon" in this article refers to the categorical, federal constitutional right to appointed
counsel at civil trial, comparable to that same right in a criminal trial in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963).
3. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981) ("If, in a given case,
the parent's interests were at their strongest, the State's interests were at their weakest, and the risks of
error were at their peak, it could not be said that the Eldridge factors did not overcome the presumption
against the right to appointed counsel, and that due process did not therefore require the appointment of
counsel.").
4. Id.
5. 316 U.S. 455 (1942). Betts, Gideon's precursor, held that the right to counsel would be
determined on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 471-72 (finding that "[W]e are unable to say that the concept
of due process incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment obligates the states, whatever may be their
own views, to furnish counsel in every [criminal case]. Every court has power, if it deems proper, to
appoint counsel where that course seems to be required in the interest of fairness."). Gideon overruled
Betts and established a categorical fight to appointed counsel. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342 ("We think
the Court in Betts was wrong, however, in concluding that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel
is not one of these fundamental rights.").
6. 372 U.S. at 344.
[6031
HeinOnline -- 15 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 603 2005-2006

TEMPLE POLITICAL & CIVIL RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:3

But trends in the Court's jurisprudence suggest that this need not be so - that
the doctrinal barrier of physical liberty need not obstruct the path to a categorical
civil right to appointed counsel. The key to averting this barrier is to seek the right
to counsel on appeal: Civil Douglas.7
A civil right to counsel on appeal has an obvious intrinsic value: poor
appellants would be guaranteed some level of equality and justice in the civil
appellate courts. But a civil fight to counsel has perhaps an even more important
instrumental value in the Civil Gideon movement. Just as Douglas foreshadowed
the categorical right to counsel at trial in Gideon forty-three years ago,8 Civil
Douglas would certainly foreshadow the categorical civil right to counsel, Civil
Gideon.
This article first examines the litigation context in which a civil right to
counsel on appeal arises. Next, the article argues that the doctrinal path to a civil
right to counsel on appeal is clearer and better paved than the path to a right to
counsel at trial. The article frames this argument in the context of U.S. Supreme
Court jurisprudence to illustrate the path by way of the federal constitution and,
vicariously, by way of those state constitutions that adopt the federal constitutional
floor as their own. (State constitutions that provide individual rights greater than
the federal constitution, of course, pave an even clearer path to a civil right to
counsel on appeal.) Finally, the article reviews and comments on the handful of
cases that have ruled on the civil right to counsel on appeal.
One final introductory note: the Civil Gideon movement is much broader than
a constitutional litigation movement. (In fact, the federal constitutional litigation
part of the movement .may well now be the tiniest piece.) As evidenced by other
presentations and articles in this Symposium, this diverse movement encompasses
everything from pro bono to judicial reform. It is within that much broader context
that this article argues for a civil right to counsel on appeal. Civil Douglas is
merely a small piece within the greater whole - a modest contribution to the much
richer movement to establish a right to counsel.
I. BACKGROUND: THE LITIGATION CONTEXT
Claims for a categorical, constitutional right to appointed counsel at trial, a
Civil Gideon, at each turn run up against a remarkably durable barrier in the
Supreme Court's right-to-counsel jurisprudence: Lassiter v. Department of Social
Services.9 The Court in Lassiter held that an indigent litigant in a proceeding to
terminate her parental rights had no categorical right to counsel (as in Gideon'(),

7. "Civil Douglas" in this article refers to the categorical, federal constitutional right to appointed
counsel on civil appeal, comparable to that same right in a criminal appeal in Douglas v. Califomia,372
U.S. 353, 357 (1963) (holding that appellants have a categorical right to counsel on appeal of a criminal
conviction).
8. See LEwis, supra note 1, at 186 (stating that Justice Douglas' opinion, which held that poor
prisoners were entitled to court-appointed counsel for their appeals, would be the rule applicable to
future trials).
9. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
10. 372 U.S. at 339-40 (holding that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused the right to the
assistance of counsel in criminal prosecutions where physical liberty is at stake).
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but that she might have a right to counsel under certain circumstances, to be
determined on a case-by-case basis." Thus, Lassiter represents the same casespecific approach to the right to counsel in cases where physical liberty was not at
stake that the Court in Gideon so roundly rejected in cases where physical liberty
was at stake.'
By one reading, Lassiter held out the promise that a right to appointed counsel
at trial, which was previously applied only to cases in which actual physical liberty
was at stake, might also extend under certain circumstances to cases involving
other weighty interests. 13 Thus, Lassiter collapsed the de facto dichotomy that had
seemingly evolved in the Court's jurisprudence on the right to counsel between
cases involving physical liberty and cases involving other weighty interests.
But in another, more important way, Lassiteractually reinforced and solidified
this dichotomy. 14 The Lassiter Court recognized the de facto trend applying the
right to counsel in Gideon only when actual physical liberty was at stake; it then
elevated this trend to constitutional significance.' 5 It did so by creating a legal
presumption in all right-to-counsel cases that the right to counsel extended only in
16
cases where actual physical liberty was at stake.
The Court seemed untroubled by the fact that its previous cases under the
Sixth Amendment focused on physical liberty only because it was the only
significant interest at stake.' 7 These cases could only have turned on physical
liberty, as the Court did not consider other interests.' 8 The Court seemed equally
untroubled by the fact that Lassiter presented its first opportunity to rule on the
right to counsel in a Fourteenth Amendment case where physical liberty was not at
stake.19 In other words, the de facto trend focusing on the physical liberty interest
was merely a function of the type of cases the Court had yet heard - Sixth
Amendment claims to the right to counsel in criminal proceedings.20 The trend
certainly did not represent any deliberate restriction on the right to counsel in
Fourteenth Amendment claims with an equally weighty interest, even if not

11. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31 ("If, in a given case, the parent's interests were at their strongest, the
State's interests were at their weakest, and the risks of error were at their peak, it could not be said that
the Eldridge factors did not overcome the presumption against the right to appointed counsel, and that
due process did not therefore require the appointment of counsel.").
12. See, e.g., Betts, 316 U.S. at 471-72 (finding that the right to counsel would be determined on a
case-by-case basis).
13. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31 ("If, in a given case, the parent's interests were at their strongest, the
State's interests were at their weakest, and the risks of error were at their peak, it could not be said that
the Eldridge factors did not overcome the presumption against the right to appointed counsel, and that
due process did not therefore require the appointment of counsel.").
14. Id. at 26-27.
15. Id. at 18.
16. Id. ("In sum, the Court's precedents speak with one voice about what 'fundamental fairness' has
meant when the Court has considered the right to appointed counsel, and we thus draw from them the
presumption that an indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may be
deprived of his physical liberty. It is against this presumption that all the other elements in the due
process decision must be measured.").
17. Id. at 25.
18. Id. at 25-26.
19. Lassiter,452 U.S. at 25-26.
20. Id.
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physical liberty. The trend simply could not have represented such a deliberate
restriction, as the Court had not yet heard such a claim - that was the very point of
the Lassiter case. 21 Nevertheless, the Court constitutionalized this trend in the form
of a presumption against counsel in any case not involving physical liberty. 2
The Court in Lassiter held this presumption up against the factors in the
familiar procedural due process test in Mathews v. Eldridge.23 That test considers
the petitioner's underlying interests, the interests of the government, and the risks
of an erroneous decision in determining the level of process due any given
petitioner. 24 By solidifying the presumption against counsel and by adopting the
Mathews test, the LassiterCourt set the course for privileging questions of interests
in Fourteenth Amendment right-to-counsel cases. Additionally, by setting its
presumption as a kind of hurdle over which the Mathews factors must leap, the
Court set the course for privileging physical liberty above all else.
Within this landscape, plaintiffs seeking a civil right to appointed counsel at
trial - a Civil Gideon - have attempted to align their interests with physical
liberty, to minimize the government's interest (or to align it with their own), and to
demonstrate that their case is complex enough to result in an erroneous decision
without counsel. 25 Because of the weight of the interest, parental rights and cases
seeking to terminate parental rights have been the primary focus of Civil Gideon
26
litigation.
This litigation strategy has thus far seen mixed results. Thus, in a line of due
process cases dealing with the right to counsel at trial, state and federal courts have
sometimes granted a right to counsel 27 and sometimes denied a right to counsel 8

21. LId. at 30-31.
22. Id. at 26-27.
23. Id. at 27 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976)).
24. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
25. See, e.g., Garramone v. Romo, 94 F.3d 1446, 1449-50 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that petitioner

had a due process fight to counsel in a deprivation-of-parental-rights hearing).
26. See infra notes 29 and 30 and accompanying text,

27. See, e.g., Garramone, 94 F.3d at 1450 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that petitioner had a due
process right to counsel in a deprivation-of-parental-rights hearing); Kenny A. v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp.
2d 1353, 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (holding that children have a due process right to counsel in deprivation
and termination-of-parental-rights proceedings, based upon their interests at stake); S.C.D. v. Etowah
County Dep't of Human Res., 841 So. 2d 277, 279 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002) (finding that due process
entitled parents to the right of counsel in a permanent child deprivation proceeding); In re O.S., 102 Cal.

App. 4th 1402, 1407 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (finding that a parent has a constitutional right to counsel); In
re K.M.P., 624 N.W.2d 472, 477-78 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that a parent in a termination
proceeding has the right to counsel); In re Welfare of Luscier, 524 P.2d 906, 908 (Wash. 1974) (holding
that appointment of counsel was constitutionally required in permanent deprivation proceedings for
indigent parents); Marathon County Dep't of Soc. Services v. I.H., Nos. 91-0058, 91-0059, 1991 Wisc.
App. LEXIS 1195, at *8 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (finding the parent was entitled to counsel under the due
process clause of the federal constitution).
28. See, e.g., In re Travarius 0., 799 N.E.2d 510, 513 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (finding that petitioner
had no right to new counsel on a fourth occasion); In re Adoption of K.L.P., 735 N.E.2d 1071, 1076 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2000) (holding that petitioner had no due process fight to counsel in a termination proceeding,
but the same petitioner had an equal protection right to counsel because similarly situated individuals
under a different statutory scheme had a statutory fight to counsel); K.D.G.L.B.P. v. Hinds County Dep't
of Human Servs., 771 So. 2d 907, 911 (Miss. 2000) (holding that petitioner had no due process right to
counsel in a termination proceeding).
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based on balancing interests under the Mathews test.2 9 The plaintiff strategy in
these cases is to equate the interest at stake - the fundamental right to parent with the fundamental physical liberty interest in Gideon,30 to minimize the state's
interest (or to align the state's interest in the well being of the child with the
parent's interest in the well being of the child), and to demonstrate that the
termination proceeding is uniquely complex, raising the probability of an erroneous
determination if counsel were not provided)1 This balance, however, inevitably
runs up against the presumption in Lassiter.32 While courts sometimes rule that the
Mathews factors3 3 overcome the Lassiter presumption,3 4 this strategy clearly cannot
yield a categorical fight to counsel without overturning Lassiter.
In seeking to avoid the Lassiter presumption, plaintiffs have won more
consistent success with claims under state constitutional provisions. 35 Some
plaintiffs have even achieved a right to counsel at trial via an equal protection claim
based on a disparity in statutory rights to counsel in different types of termination
proceedings. 36 While these strategies may continue to yield success, 37 as state-by-

29. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35.
30. 372 U.S. at 341.
31. Plaintiffs' strategies are demonstrated by the cases. See, e.g., In re the Custody of J.M., No.
48319-6-I, 2002 WL 31412728, at *5-*6 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that petitioner had a due
process right to counsel in a deprivation-of-parental-rights hearing).
32. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26-27. The barrier presented by the Lassiterpresumption has been subject
to criticism. See, e.g., Bruce A. Boyer, Justice, Access to the Courts, and the Right to Free Counselfor
Indigent Parents: The Continuing Scourge of Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham, 36
LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 363 (2005) (urging reconsideration of the Lassiter holding based on the complexity of
custody and parental rights and the inability of parents to properly represent themselves in proceedings
that are of great importance and comparable to issues of liberty interest). Others have argued for slight
modifications to the balancing test - e.g., to focus on the child's interest in a termination proceeding to gain greater traction with the Matthews test. See, e.g., Judge Michael D. Bustamante, Incorporating
the Law of Criminal Procedure in Termination of Parental Rights Cases: Giving Children a Voice
Through Matthews v. Eldridge, 32 N.M. L. REv. 143 (2002) (looking at criminal law and child-centered
best interests approaches in developing an alternative balancing test).
33. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35.
34. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26-27.
35. See, e.g., ICP.B. v. D.C.A., 685 So. 2d 750, 751 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) (rejecting Lassiterunder
the state constitution, and holding that an indigent parent had a state constitutional right to counsel in a
termination proceeding); In re K.L.J., 813 P.2d 276, 279-86 (Alaska 1991) (rejecting Lassiter under the
state constitution, and holding that a parent had a state constitutional right to counsel in a termination
proceeding); In re Jay R., 150 Cal. App. 3d 251, 260-62 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (rejecting Lassiter
under the state constitution, and holding that an indigent parent had a state constitutional right to counsel
in a termination proceeding); Danforth v. State Dep't of Health & Welfare, 303 A.2d 794, 795 (Me.
1973) (holding that an indigent defendant in a custody proceeding was entitled to appointed counsel
under state constitutional procedural due process); In re A.S.A., 852 P.2d 127, 129 (Mont. 1993)
(holding that a parent had a state constitutional due process right to appointed counsel in a proceeding to
terminate parental rights); State ex rel. T.H. v. Min, 802 S.W.2d 625 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that
the parent in this termination case was entitled to counsel under the state constitution, but that the state
constitution did not grant a categorical right to counsel in termination proceedings).
36. See, e.g., In re Adoption of K.L.P., 735 N.E.2d at 1071, 1078 (111. App. Ct. 2000) (holding that a
litigant under the state Adoption Act, which did not provide for appointed counsel, had a state
constitutional equal protection right to counsel, where a similarly situated litigant under the Juvenile
Court Act would have had a statutory right to counsel); In re Adoption of K.A.S., 499 N.W.2d 558, 566
(N.D. 1993) (holding that a litigant under the state Adoption Act, in which the right to counsel was
uncertain, had a state constitutional equal protection right to counsel, where a similarly situated litigant
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state strategies they will, at best, yield a spotty, patchwork result resembling the
right to counsel under the case-by-case approach in Betts that the Gideon Court
overturned.

38

II. CIVIL DOUGLAS
While the doctrinal path to Civil Gideon is thus encumbered by the Lassiter
presumption, the doctrinal path to a civil right to counsel on appeal - Civil
Douglas - seems relatively clear. The starting point for this claim is the 1996
case, M.L.B. v. S.L.J. 39 If Lassiter represents a partial collapse of the de facto

dichotomy between right-to-counsel cases involving physical liberty and those
involving other weighty interests, 40 then M.L.B. represents the collapse of the
dichotomies between civil cases and criminal cases, between access-barrier cases
and right-to-counsel cases, and between rights at trial and rights on appeal. 4' In a
wide-ranging decision, the Court in M.L.B. romps through its judicial-access and
right-to-counsel decisions, freely comparing interests such as the right to parent
with interests like professional prospects in order to place that case within the
broader mosaic of its access and right-to-counsel jurisprudence. 42 In order to effect
these results, the Court relies upon a kind of conglomerated due process-equal

protection approach:

under the Juvenile Court Act and the Parentage Act had a certain statutory right to counsel). But see,
e.g., In re Curtis S., 25 Cal. App. 4th 687, 691-693 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that an appellant
who appeals a termination order in a private action had no equal protection right to counsel, even though
a similarly situated appellant in a state-initiated termination case had a statutory right to counsel),
abrogatedby In re J.W., 57 P.3d 363 (Cal. 2002) (holding that an appellant who appeals a termination
order in a private action had no equal protection right to counsel, even though a similarly situated
appellant in a state-initiated termination case had a statutory right to counsel).
37. There is some risk that the state equal protection cases could paradoxically yield a set-back: If
states are concerned about the disparity in statutory right-to-counsel under different statutory schemes of
the same general type (e.g., schemes terminating parental rights), they may simply revoke the statutory
right to counsel in all statutory schemes of that type to avoid the disparate treatment and equal
protection problems.
38. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342.
39. 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
40. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 19.
41. M.LB., 519 U.S. at 120.
42. M.LB. has been subject to much commentary based on this approach. See, e.g., Lloyd C.
Anderson, The ConstitutionalRight of Poor People to Appeal Without Payment of Fees: Convergence of
Due Process and Equal Protection in M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 32 U. MicH. J.L. REFORM 441 (1999) (arguing
that Justice Thomas offered a forceful and precient criticism of the approach in his dissent in that case).
An excerpt from the dissent follows:
Under the rule announced today, I do not see how a civil litigant could constitutionally be
denied a free transcript in any case that involves an interest that is arguably as important as
the interest in Mayer.... What is more, it must be remembered that Griffin did not merely
invent the free transcript right for criminal appellants; it was also the launching pad for the
discovery of a host of other rights .... I fear that the growth of Griffin in the criminal area
may be mirrored in the civil area.
M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 143-44 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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We observe first that the Court's decisions concerning access to
judicial processes, commencing with Griffin and running through
Mayer, reflect both equal protection and due process concerns....
[I]n the Court's Griffin-line of cases, "[d]ue process and equal
protection principles converge." The equal protection concern
relates to the legitimacy of fencing out would-be appellants based
solely on their inability to pay core costs. . . . The due process
concern homes in on the essential fairness of the state-ordered
proceedings anterior to adverse state action. A "precise rationale"
be
has not been composed ... because cases of this order "cannot
4' 3
resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis.

In the course of creating its mosaic, the M.L.B. Court reaffirms and even
expands some central principles from Lassiter. First, it reaffirms the importance of
carefully comparing underlying interests in the context of something like a
place of physical
Mathews balancing test." Second, it reaffirms the privileged
45
jurisprudence.
right-to-counsel
and
judicial-access
its
liberty in
The M.L.B. Court's willingness to adopt a conglomerated approach, and the
concomitant free comparison of cases across civil and criminal, across those
dealing with barriers and those dealing with the right to counsel, and across trial
and appeal, reveals another pattern: cases dealing with access and the right to
counsel at trial turn first on underlying interests, while cases dealing with access
and the right to counsel on appeal turn first on principles of equality and
procedure.46
Within the Court's mosaic of access and right-to-counsel cases, the Court has
looked first to the underlying interests at issue to determine the level of access or
right to counsel due a particular litigant. In short, interests bind rights at trial. Let
us call this the "priority of interests" for shorthand.
In contrast, the Court has looked first to equality of access and the procedural
extent to which a right is available on appeal. Rights on appeal are bound by
principles of equality and the type of appeal at issue. Let us call this the "priority
of equality in process" for shorthand.
The net result of these trends is that a claim for a civil right to appointed
counsel at trial - Civil Gideon - will turn first on the interests involved. And
unless a litigant can show a balance of interests sufficient to overcome the Lassiter
presumption, the Constitution will not demand appointed counsel. At best this
47
approach leads to a case-by-case determination, similar to that in Betts v. Brady.
But a claim for a civil right to appointed counsel on appeal - Civil Douglas
- will turn first on principles of equality and procedure (or the type of appeal at
issue in the given case). Because the underlying interests matter less on appeal,
and because a litigant does not face the Lassiter presumption on appeal, the

43. Id. at 120 (citations omitted).

44. Id.
45. Id. at 121-24.
46. Id. at 103.
47. 316U.S.at471.

HeinOnline -- 15 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 609 2005-2006

TEMPLE POLITICAL & CIVIL RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:3

doctrinal path to Civil Douglas is clearer and better paved than the path to Civil
48
Gideon.
The following analysis first traces the Court's jurisprudence at trial, focusing
on the right to counsel at trial, then on the access cases at trial. Second, the
analysis traces the Court's jurisprudence on appeal, focusing on the access cases on
49
appeal, then on the right to counsel on appeal.
A. The Priorityof Interests at Trial
This section illustrates the priority of interests at trial, moving first through the
cases on the right to counsel at trial and next through the access cases at trial. Both
lines of cases show that the rights involved - the right to counsel and the right of
access - turn first on the underlying interests at stake.
1. The Right to Counsel at Trial and the Priority of Interests
The Court's jurisprudence on the right to counsel at trial seemed to shift
somewhat over time in its emphasis on the complexity of the proceedings and the
precise nature of the interest at stake. In its earliest Sixth Amendment cases, for
example, the Court seemed to prioritize principles of equity and fairness in a
complex, adversarial proceeding over the litigant's interest the criminal
defendant's physical liberty interest - in determining whether a defendant had a
right to appointed counsel. 50 Later Sixth Amendment cases, and especially the
most recent cases, emphasized the precise nature of the defendant's liberty interest
in determining the right to appointed counsel. 51 Similarly, the Fourteenth
Amendment cases seemed to shift their focus between the complexity of the
proceedings and the nature of the interest at stake, but the most recent cases
52
prioritized the interest.

48. The importance of Douglas may not have surprised commentators on March 18, 1963, the day
both Gideon and Douglas came down. For example, constitutional scholars Yale Kamisar and Jesse
Choper wrote this about the two opinions: "If Gideon only toppled 'a bridge shaky and ready to come
down,' Douglas may have dynamited some rather sturdy-looking ones." Yale Kamisar & Jesse Choper,
The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Findingsand Legal-Policy Observations, 48 MINN. L.

REV. 1, 7 (1963). Professor Kamisar went on to predict "that twenty years from now, perhaps sooner,
Gideon, not Douglas, will be regarded as 'the other' right-to-counsel case handed down on March 18,
1963." Yale Kamisar, Book Review, 78 HARV. L. REV. 478, 481 (1964) (reviewing ANTHONY LEWIS,
GIDEON'S TRUMPET (Random House 1964)).
49. The analysis necessarily excludes some cases, even lines of cases. Because it relies on the
reasoning and conglomerated framework set out in M.LB., it also relies on the cases and lines of cases
cited therein.
50. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 29-32 (1972) (balancing equity and justice in determining
the right for counsel); Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342 (arguing that individuals have a right to counsel for the
purpose of a fair trial); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932) (arguing that individuals have a
right to counsel for the purpose of a fair trial).
51. See, e.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 370-72 (1979) (solidifying the focus on physical
liberty).

52, Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494-97 (1980) (focusing on the inherent weight of the liberty
interest at stake in determining an individual's right to counsel).
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Notwithstanding this doctrinal evolution, one principle becomes clear in all
trial-level right-to-counsel cases after about 1979:53 the right to appointed counsel
turns first on the litigant's interest - physical liberty. This priority of the interest
of physical liberty in determining the right to counsel in many ways hits its apex in
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, a Fourteenth Amendment case in which
the Court elevated the priority of physical liberty to a presumption against counsel
54
in any case where physical liberty was not at stake.
This section traces the evolution of the cases on the right to counsel at trial
through the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to illustrate the priority of the
interest of physical liberty in both lines of cases.
a. Sixth Amendment Right to Appointed Counsel at Trial
The starting point for the right to appointed counsel is, of course, Gideon.15
The Court in Gideon held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal
cases applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. 56
Gideon thus overturned Betts v.Brady,5 7 which held that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel was not a "fundamental right, essential to a fair trial,"58 and
therefore that it was not incorporated to the states. 9 After Betts, any right to
counsel in a state criminal prosecution would be determined on a case-by-case basis
by the presiding court, based on "the interest of fairness,"60 not the Sixth
Amendment. In overturning Betts, Gideon ended the case-by-case approach to the
right to counsel and instead established a categorical right to appointed counsel for
indigent defendants in state criminal prosecutions. 6' As if to punctuate the
importance of counsel in criminal proceedings, 62 Gideon went one step further: it
held that when a defendant could not afford counsel, counsel must be appointed. 63
Thus, Gideon established a categoricalright to appointed counsel for indigents in
state criminal prosecutions. 64
On one level, Gideon simply holds that the Court in Betts erred in not
incorporating the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the states: "We think the

53. In 1979, when Scott, 440 U.S. 367, came down, the decision solidified the focus on physical
liberty. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26-27 (emphasizing the focus on physical liberty).

54. Id. at 25-26.
55. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
56. Id.
57. 316 U.S. 455 (1942) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not incorporated to
the states via the Fourteenth Amendment).
58. ld. at 471.
59. id.
60. Id. at 471-72 ("Every court has power, if it deems proper, to appoint counsel where that course
seems to be required in the interest of fairness.").
61. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339-40.
62. Id. at 344 ("That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the money
hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal
courts are necessities, not luxuries.").
63. See id. ("Not only these precedents but also reason and reflection require us to recognize that in
our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer,
cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.").
64. Id. at 344.
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Court in Betts had ample precedent for acknowledging that those guarantees of the
Bill of Rights which are fundamental safeguards of liberty immune from federal
abridgment are equally protected65 against state invasion for the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment."
On this level, Gideon analyzed the Sixth Amendment right to counsel under
familiar incorporation standards, including whether the right was "fundamental. '" 66
In answering this question, the Court looked to well settled cases going back as far
as ten years before Betts and holding that "the right to the aid of counsel is of this
fundamental character," 67 "among [those incorporated rights were] the fundamental
right of the accused to the aid of counsel in a criminal prosecution," 68 and "[the
assistance of counsel] is one of the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment deemed
necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty." 69 Thus,
according to the Court in Gideon, Betts rested on tenuous grounds even when it
came down; certainly in 1963, when Gideon reached the Court, Betts indeed looked
like a "bridge shaky and ready to come down." 70 Gideon, as a case on
incorporation of the fundamental right to counsel in criminal prosecutions, was
therefore not tremendously surprising.
On a different level, Gideon set the Court on a path to determine the
categorical right to counsel in both criminal and civil trials based on the underlying
interests at stake. 71 This reading may have surprised the Gideon Court, for nothing
in the Gideon opinion compels this result. In other words, by its plain terms,
Gideon does not turn on the underlying right at stake - there, Clarence Earl
Gideon's physical liberty interest in avoiding incarceration. 72 Rather, the language
of Gideon73 suggests that the case turns instead on ensuring a fair trial in the highly
74
adversarial criminal courts - irrespective of the underlying liberty interest.
Thus, the Court writes:
[I]n our adversar[ial] system of criminal justice, any person haled
into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair
trial unless counsel is provided for him .... Governments, both state

and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to establish
machinery to try defendants accused of crime. Lawyers to prosecute
are everywhere deemed essential to protect the public's interests in
an orderly society. Similarly, there are few defendants charged with
crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to

65. Id. at 341.
66. Id.
67. Powell, 287 U.S. at 68.

68. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936).
69. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938) (stating that "[t]he Sixth Amendment stands as a
constant admonition that if the constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not 'still be
done"').
70. Kamisar & Choper, supra note 48, at 7 (quoting KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 303 (William S. Hein & Co.) (1960)).
71. 372 U.S. at 343-44.

72. Id. at 337-39.
73. Id. at 343-44.

74. Id. at 344.
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prepare and present their defenses. That government hires lawyers
to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to
defend are the strongest indications of the widespread belief that
lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.... From the
very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have
laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards
designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which
every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot
be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his
75
accusers without a lawyer to assist him.
The language and reasoning seem to set the Court on a path to cabin the right
to counsel at trial first based on considerations of fairness, equity, and the
adversarial nature of the proceeding - considerations that might easily extend
beyond a criminal case and apply in civil cases, but for the fact that the right to
counsel in Gideon rested on the Sixth Amendment (and not squarely on the
Fourteenth Amendment). 76 The reasoning does not suggest that the right to counsel
at trial turns first on the underlying interests of the defendant, although Clarence
Earl Gideon's liberty interests certain loomed strongly in the background of the
77
case.
Nearly 10 years later, the Court in Argersinger v. Hamlin7t seemed to balance
considerations of equity and fairness in a criminal prosecution with the defendant's
liberty interests in determining the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 79 Thus like
Gideon,80 Argersinger turned on principles of equity and fairness in a highly
adversarial criminal prosecution, 81 though the Court seemed to grant somewhat
greater weight to the defendant's liberty interests. 82 The criminal defendant in
Argersinger was charged with carrying a concealed weapon, punishable by
imprisonment up to six months, a $1000 fine, or both. 83 The trial court sentenced
him to ninety days in jail without the benefit of appointed counsel. 84 The U.S.
Supreme Court rejected the Florida Supreme Court's ruling that the Gideon right to
appointed counsel 85 extended only to "non-petty offenses punishable by more than
six months imprisonment" 86 and held that the Sixth Amendment right to appointed
counsel applies to any case that actually leads to imprisonment. 87 In defining the

75. Id. at 342 (arguing that individuals have a right to counsel for the purpose of a fair trial).
76. Id.
77. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 338-39.

78. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
79. Id. at 37-38 ("We hold that no person may be deprived of his liberty who has been denied the
assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.").
80. 372 U.S. at 344.
81. Argersinger,407 U.S. at 32-33.
82. Id. at 37-38.

83. Id. at 26.
84. Id.
85. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.

86. State ex rel. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 236 So. 2d 442, 443 (Fla. 1970) (following Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968), in holding that the right to a jury trial applied only in cases where
the criminal defendant faced more than six months in prison), rev'd, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
87. Argersinger,407 U.S. at 37.
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scope of the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel, the language and
reasoning in Argersinger suggest that the right turns both on principles of fairness
and equity in the context of a highly adversarial criminal prosecution and the
defendant's liberty interests. 8 The Court wrote, "[w]e are by no means convinced
that legal and constitutional questions involved in a case that actually leads to
imprisonment even for a brief period are any less complex than when a person can
be sent off for six months or more." 89 Because of the seemingly heightened
concern for the defendant's liberty interest - and the specific focus on
imprisonment - this reasoning may translate less well to a right to counsel in
complex civil cases than the reasoning in Gideon.
Against this reading of Gideon and Argersinger,the Court in Scott v. Illinois"
completes its move to prioritize the defendant's liberty interests in right-to-counsel
cases. 9' The Court in Scott limited the right to counsel to those trials that would
92
result in actual imprisonment - that is, an actual deprivation of physical liberty.
Thus, the right to counsel in Scott turned first on the defendant's liberty interest,
not the previously prioritized considerations of equity and fairness in criminal
prosecutions. 93 Scott involved a criminal prosecution for shoplifting merchandise
valued at less than $150.94 The defendant was convicted under an Illinois statute
that set the maximum penalty at either a $500 fine or one year in jail, or both. 95 He
received a $50 fine, with no jail time. 96 In holding that the defendant had no Sixth
Amendment right to appointed counsel, the Court's reasoning focused primarily on
the defendant's liberty interests, not principles of equity and fairness in a criminal
trial.97 Thus, the Court wrote: "We therefore hold that the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution require only that no indigent
criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has
afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense." 98Although
the Court in Scott seemed to prioritize the defendant's liberty interests, criminal
prosecution principles of equity and fairness certainly did not drop out of
consideration. 99
Most recently, the Court reaffirmed the priority of the defendant's liberty
interest in Alabama v. Sheltonl°° by summarizing the holding in the Gideon-

88. Id. at 33.
89, Id,(emphasis added). The Court referred throughout the opinion to trials "where an accused is

deprived of his liberty" and to "a case that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period,"
suggesting the importance of the defendant's liberty interest in determining a Sixth Amendment right to
appointed counsel. Id. at 32-33 (emphasis added).
90. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
91. Id. at 369.

92. Id. at 373.
93. id.
94. Id.at 368.
95. Id.
96. Scott, 440 U.S. at 370-72.
97. Id. at 373 (quoting Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 25, in prioritizing the defendant's liberty interests
over principles of equity and fairness in determining the right to counsel).
98. id. at 373-74 (emphasis added).

99. Id.at 373.
100. 535 U.S. 654 (2002).
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Argersinger-Scott line with the phrase, "'actual imprisonment' rule."''
defendant in Shelton was sentenced to thirty days in jail, but the trial court
02
immediately suspended the sentence and imposed a two-year period of probation.1
The Court ruled that the defendant was entitled to appointed counsel at trial
because the sentence, probation, could have resulted in the actual deprivation of his
liberty.103
On the one hand, the Court's almost exclusive focus on the defendant's liberty
interest underscored the priority of the defendant's liberty interest in Sixth
Amendment cases on the right to counsel. 1°4 But, on the other hand, Shelton also
demonstrated how attenuated a defendant's liberty interest may be to trigger the
right to counsel at trial. 05 The Court in Shelton thus held that the critical turning
point in its Sixth Amendment jurisprudence was not whether a defendant had a
right to counsel in a trial where he or she might lose his or her liberty immediately,
but rather whether the defendant had a right to counsel for the underlying trial for
which he or she was ultimately imprisoned. 1°6 The Court distinguished between a
probation-revocation hearing and the underlying trial and ruled that the defendant,
imprisoned after a probation violation, was actually imprisoned for the underlying
07
offense - the offense for which he had been convicted at his underlying trial.
Therefore, the right to counsel attached at the point of trial because even probation
with a suspended prison term may result in actual imprisonment for the underlying
offense.108
In terms of the liberty interest, the Court in Shelton seemed to take a step back
from the state-imposed deprivation of liberty in the Gideon-Argersinger-Scottline,
and instead, included a deprivation that in some important ways was selfimposed t°9 In other words, a defendant sentenced to probation has some choice in
whether he or she goes to prison because an individual is subject to imprisonment
only if he or she violates the terms of probation. The imprisonment results, to be
sure, from the underlying criminal conviction, but the element of self-determination
in the probation context distinguishes probation from a criminal trial at which an
actual term of imprisonment is immediately imposed by the state and presumably
against the interests and choice of the defendant.

101. Id. at662.
102. Id.at658.
103. Id. at 674 (ruling that a probation violation would result in imprisonment for the underlying
crime, not for the probation violation, and thus the probation sentence may have resulted in deprivation
of liberty. Therefore, the defendant was entitled to appointed counsel at trial for the underlying crime.).
104. Id. It is critical to note, however, that the Court must have seriously considered principles of
equity and fairness in an adversarial criminal trial to arrive at its conclusion here. The Court's narrow
focus on the underlying criminal trial (as opposed to the probation revocation hearing) as the relevant
point at which defendant's liberty interest is at stake, suggests that the Court was keenly attuned to
principles of equity and fairness at the trial - the "critical stage when . .. his vulnerability to
imprisonment is determined." Id.
105. Shelton, 535 U.S. at 654.
106. Id. at 664.

107. Id.
108. id.
109. Id.at 674.
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Shelton was a capstone to the Sixth Amendment cases on the right to counsel
at trial because it reaffirmed the Court's priority of the defendant's interests, but it
also seemed to relax the demand for an interest in involuntary incarceration as the
trigger for the right to counsel."" Instead, Shelton, perhaps foreshadowing Halbert
v. Michigan,"' opened the door for a right to counsel in situations where an
individual voluntarily places his or her liberty in peril, even if the underlying
2
conviction ultimately resulting in incarceration was involuntary.
b. Fourteenth Amendment Right to Appointed Counsel at Trial
These same considerations - the defendant's liberty interests and principles
of equity and fairness in the context of adversarial proceedings - also drove the
Court's decisions in the right-to-counsel cases at trial under the Fourteenth
Amendment. From the earliest cases in this line, the Court made clear that, just as
in the more recent Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel cases at trial, the defendant's
liberty interest was paramount in the Fourteenth Amendment right-to-counsel cases
at trial.
The earliest case in this line is In re Gault,' 3 where the Court held that a youth
was entitled to appointed counsel in a juvenile delinquency hearing that resulted in
his commitment to a state industrial school. 114 Although the Court's decision
closely examined the nature of juvenile delinquency proceedings, the ruling turned
primarily on the liberty interest at stake." 5 Referencing Powell v. Alabama, 1 6
8 the Court
Gideon v. Wainwright,' 7 and Kent v. United States,"1
held "that [the
right to counsel] is ...essential for the determination of delinquency, carrying with
it the awesome prospect of incarcerationin a state institution until the juvenile
reaches the age of 21.""19 The Court concluded:
[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
that in respect of proceedings to determine delinquency which may
result in commitment to an institution in which the juvenile's
freedom is curtailed,the child and his parents must be notified of the
child's right to be represented by counsel retained by them, or if they
are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed to
represent the child. 20

110. Id. at 654.
111. 125 S. Ct. 2582 (2005).

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Shelton, 535 U.S. at 654.
387 U.S. 1 (1967).
Id. at4.
Id. at27.
287 U.S. 45 (1932).
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
383 U.S. 541 (1966).
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 36-37 (emphasis added).
Id. at 41 (emphasis added).

HeinOnline -- 15 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 616 2005-2006

CIVIL DOUGLAS

Summer 20061

The Court similarly prioritized the defendant's liberty interest in Vitek v.
Jones.12' That case parsed the liberty interest even more finely, and the right to
counsel thus attached based on a particular type of liberty. The Court in that case
held that a convicted felon transferred from a state prison to a mental hospital was
entitled to a hearing and appointed counsel prior to transfer. 22 The liberty interest
was based upon the prisoner's reasonable expectation that, as codified in state law,
he would not be transferred to a mental hospital unless he suffered from a mental
disease or defect that could not be treated in the prison. 23 The Court distinguished
this transfer from an administrative transfer between prisons - which ordinarily
did not give rise to a liberty interest - because such a transfer was generally within
the sound discretion of the prison authorities. 2 4 The liberty interest here thus
attached to a particular kind of transfer within the system, not the broader liberty to
be free from restraint entirely on which the earlier cases turned. Whether the
prisoner was incarcerated, was transferred to another prison, or was transferred to
the mental hospital, he had already lost his broader liberty. Yet the transfer to the
hospital triggered a more narrow liberty interest protected by the state laws
authorizing that kind of transfer.
In contrast to In re Gault25 and Vitek v. Jones,126 the Court ruled in Gagnon v.
Scarpellil2 that a criminal convict had no absolute right to appointed counsel. In
that case, the defendant, Scarpelli, was found guilty of armed robbery and was
sentenced to fifteen years in prison. 2 8 The trial judge suspended Scarpelli's
sentence and placed him on probation for seven years. 129 Just one day after he

started his probation period, Scarpelli was apprehended in the course of a burglary,
in violation of the terms of his probation. 130 The Court ruled that a probation
revocation hearing implicated a lesser "conditional liberty," not the absolute liberty
in, say, In re Gault."' As to the right to counsel, the Court relied on the
rehabilitative nature of probation and the informal nature of the probation

121.

445 U.S. 480 (1980).

122, Id. at 496-97.
123. Id. at 487-88.
124. Id. at 489.
125. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
126. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).

127.
128.
129.
130.

411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973).
Id. at 779.
Id.
Id. at 779-80.

131. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 781 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)). The Court
aligned a probation revocation hearing with a parole revocation hearing, based on the level of interest,
liberty, at stake: "[Parole rievocation deprives an individual, not of the absolute liberty to which every
citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole
restrictions." Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480 (1972). Similarly, the Court distinguished the combined
probation revocation and sentencing hearing in Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967), based on the level
of interest at stake:
[C]ounsel must be provided an indigent at sentencing even when it is accomplished as part
of a subsequent probation revocation proceeding. But this line of reasoning does not
require a hearing or counsel at the time of probation revocation in a case such as the present
one, where the probationer was sentenced at the time of trial.
Scarpelli,411 U.S. at 781.
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revocation proceeding in ruling that the Due Process Clause did not demand a
categorical right to appointed counsel in probation revocation proceedings.1 32
Scarpelli thus suggests that when the interest at stake is lower than absolute liberty
and when the proceedings are less than fully adversarial, the Due Process Clause
may not require appointed counsel. Instead, the Fourteenth Amendment right to
counsel would be determined on a Betts-like case-by-case basis.
The Court in Lassitersolidified this principle and marked the high point of the
Court's priority of liberty in its right-to-counsel jurisprudence.1 33 Lassiter ruled
that an indigent parent was not entitled to appointed counsel in a case brought by
the state to terminate her parental rights.' 34 The Court applied the now-familiar
three-part procedural due process test articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge'35 and
concluded that
the parent's interest is an extremely important one (and may be
supplemented by the dangers of criminal liability inherent in some
termination proceedings); the State shares with the parent an interest
in a correct decision, has a relatively weak pecuniary interest, and, in
some but not all cases, has a possibly stronger interest in informal
procedures; and the complexity of the proceeding and the incapacity
of the uncounseled parent could be, but would not always be, great
enough to make the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the parent's
rights insupportably high.136
Then, in a rather surprising move, the Court reviewed the line of cases running
from Gideon through In re Gault (and discussed supra) and concluded that the right
to appointed counsel had historically attached only at the point of deprivation of
personal liberty. 137 Then, from this observation, it created out of whole cloth a new
"presumption" that an indigent litigant had a right to counsel only in cases
involving a deprivation of liberty:
In sum, the Court's precedents speak with one voice about what
"fundamental fairness" has meant when the Court has considered the
right to appointed counsel, and we thus draw from them the
presumption that an indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel
only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty. It

132. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 781, 783-89.
133. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32-34.
134. Id.
135. 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
136. Lassiter,452 U.S. at 31.
137. Id. at 25-26. The Court's observation here was positive, not normative. The Court concluded as
a matter of fact that its cases granted the right to appointed counsel only when physical liberty was at
stake. But this truth was more a matter of historical accident than doctrinal necessity. The whole point
of Lassiter,of course, was to rule on the right to counsel in a new type of case - a case where physical
liberty was not at stake. By incorporating the historical accident (that no type of interest other than
physical liberty had as a matter of fact triggered the right to counsel) into its constitutional doctrine, the
Court seemed to try to have it both ways; it preserved the priority of physical liberty, but it allowed for

the future possibility of another interest to trigger the right to counsel.
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is against this presumption that . . .[the factors in the three-part
38
Mathews test, discussed supra] must be measured.'

The Court elevated physical liberty to this level of presumption
notwithstanding its previous, much more nuanced examinations of physical liberty
interests in In re Gault, Vitek, and Scarpelli, which, taken together, might have
suggested that "physical liberty" alone is far too rough a triggering mechanism for
the right to counsel. In other words, even in 1981, the Court might reasonably have
concluded that some types of physical liberty categorically trigger the right to
appointed counsel, while others do not. It might reasonably have concluded further
that some interest beyond physical liberty might trigger the right to appointed
counsel, while others might not. If it had so concluded, it could not have created
the "physical liberty presumption," which, by its nature, elevates physical liberty
above all considerations in the Mathews balancing test. The hurdle of physical
liberty that the presumption set for the Mathews factors to overcome thus solidified
the priority of physical liberty - and the lesser place of other due process interests
and the complexity of the proceeding - in the Court's right-to-counsel
1 39
jurisprudence at trial.
2. Access to the Courts and the Priority of Interests
The priority of interests couples with the monopoly power of the courts (a
concept derivative of the interests) in the access cases. This section traces first the
fee cases, and then the standard of evidence cases to show that, like the counsel
cases, the priority of interests reigns supreme in the cases at trial.
a. Fee Barriers to Court
The priority of interests is perhaps most salient in the fee cases, where an
impending litigant's access to a trial court is denied because of his or her inability
to pay court fees or costs. The leading case here is Boddie v. Connecticut,1'° which
involved a trial court fee of about $60 for individuals seeking a divorce. 41 The fee
effectively denied access to the trial court for the class of individuals who could not
afford to pay it.142 The Court held that the fee requirement ran afoul of the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. 143

138. Id. at 26-27.
139. Doug Besharov sharply criticized this move in Lassiter in a now famous comment in the
immediate aftermath of the decision, "Lassiter, for all practical purposes, stands for the proposition that
a drunken driver's night in the cooler is a greater deprivation of liberty than a parent's permanent loss of
rights in a child." Douglas J. Besharov, Terminating Parental Rights: The Indigent Parent's Right to

Counsel After Lassiter v. North Carolina, 15 FAM. L.Q. 205, 221 (1981).
140. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
141. Id. at 372.

142. Id. at 372-73.
143. Id. at 382-83.

At least two justices read Boddie more broadly, to turn on the poverty

classification (sounding in equal protection) instead of the underlying right (sounding in due process).
See Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954, 955-56 (1971) (Black, J., denying certiorari) ("In

my view, the decision in Boddie v. Connecticutcan safely rest on only one crucial foundation - that the
civil courts of the United States and each of the States belong to the people of this country and that no
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The Court's opinion turned first on the underlying interest at stake: the right to
marry (and divorce).' 4 But the Court was also keenly attuned to the fact that
litigants may only terminate their marriage through the courts - that courts have a
monopoly on divorce. 45 Thus, the Court concluded:
[G]iven the basic position of the marriage relationship in this
society's hierarchy of values and the concomitant state
monopolization of the means for legally dissolving this relationship,
due process does prohibit a State from denying, solely because of
inability to pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek judicial
dissolution of their marriages. '4
The Court ruled similarly in Little v. Streater, 47 a case involving a state statute
that required the party seeking blood grouping tests in a paternity action (here, the
putative father) to pay for those tests. 4 8 Like the Court in Lassiter, discussed
49
supra, the Court in Streater turned to the balancing test in Mathews v. Eldridge,
and thus focused first on the interests of the litigant:
The private interests implicated here are substantial. Apart from the
putative father's pecuniary interest in avoiding a substantial support
obligation and liberty interests threatened by the possible sanctions
for noncompliance, at issue is the creation of a parent-child
relationship. This Court has frequently stressed the importance of
familial bonds, whether or not legitimized by marriage, and accorded
them constitutional protection. 50
The Court's very careful consideration of the interests at stake and the
alternatives to litigation (if any, and derivative of those interests) is further
illustrated by its comparison of the interest here with the interests in Boddie,
discussed supra, and United States v. Kras'5 1 and Ortwein v. Schwab," 2 both
discussed infra:

person can be denied access to those courts, either for a trial or an appeal, because he cannot pay a fee,
finance a bond, risk a penalty, or afford to hire an attorney."). See also Meltzer, 402 U.S. at 961
(Douglas, J., denying certiorari) ("I believe a proper application of the Equal Protection Clause also
requires that the access cases be reversed. Courts ought not be a private preserve for the affluent. All of
these cases contain an invidious discrimination based on poverty, a suspect legislative classification.").
If the access cases at trial
turned on the poverty classification, these cases would look more like the
access cases and right-to-counsel case on appeal, discussed infra.
144. See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 376 ("As this Court on more than one occasion has recognized,
marriage involves interests of basic importance in our society.").
145. See id. ("For at that point, the judicial proceeding becomes the only effective means of resolving
the dispute at hand and denial of a defendant's full access to that process raises grave problems for its

legitimacy.").
146. Id. at 374 (emphasis added).
147. 452 U.S. 1 (1981).

148. Id. at 3-4.
149. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35.
150. Streater,452 U.S. at 13.
151. 409 U.S. 434 (1972).
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In Boddie, we held that due process prohibits a state from denying an
indigent access to its divorce courts because of inability to pay filing
fees and costs. However, in [Kras and Ortwein], the Court
concluded that due process does not require waiver of filing fees for
an indigent seeking a discharge in bankruptcy or appellate review of
an agency determination resulting in reduced welfare benefits. Our
decisions in Kras and Ortwein emphasized the availability of other
relief and the less "fundamental" character of the private interests at
stake than those implicated in Boddie. Because appellant has no
choice of an alternative forum and his interests, as well as those of
the child, are constitutionally significant, this case is comparable to
13
Boddie rather than to Kras and Ortwein. "
Thus based on the very weighty interests at stake and on the monopoly of the courts
in availing those interests, the Court ruled that the requirement that a litigant pay
154
for blood tests violated the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
Consistent with the priority of interests at trial, then, when a litigant's interests
are at the apex - that is, when physical liberty is at stake - the Court has
Thus was the case in
unsurprisingly ruled fee requirements unconstitutional.'
56
Bearden v. Georgia,1
in which the Court ruled that a criminal sentencing court
could not revoke probation (and imprison the defendant) for failure to pay a fine
and make restitution, pursuant to the defendant's terms of probation. 57 Bearden
does not contain the kind of careful parsing of interests as in other fee cases; it does
not have to: the interest at stake - physical liberty - is concededly fundamental.
But the Court in Bearden was also very careful to limit its principle to those
probationers who cannot afford to pay a fine, not to those who choose not to pay a
fine, 158 thus removing the element of choice from constitutional protection. This
holding seems in tension with the principle in Shelton, discussed supra, which held
that a defendant had a right to counsel at trial when the trial court suspended a
prison sentence and imposed probation, because a probation violation, based
presumably on a volitional act, would result in incarceration.159

152.
153.
154.
155.
stake.

410 U.S. 656 (1972).
Streater,452 U.S. at 16 n.12 (citations omitted).
id. at 16-17.
The Court has also ruled transcript fees unconstitutional in cases where physical liberty is at
See Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967) (holding that an indigent criminal defendant subject

to incarceration was entitled to a transcript, at state expense, of a preliminary hearing); Morrissey, 408
U.S. 471 (holding that due process demands certain procedural requirements at a parole revocation
hearing). But see Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971) (holding that an indigent criminal
defendant subject to incarceration in a second trial was not entitled to a transcript of his first trial (which
ended in deadlock), because adequate alternatives to a transcript were available). Like the other cases in
the Boddie-Streater-Kras-Ortweinline, these cases turn on the interests at stake and whether alternatives
to the particular process exist to protect or avail the underlying interests.
156. 461 U.S. 660 (1982).
157. Id. at 672.
158. Id. at 668-69.
159. Shelton, 535 U.S. at 662.
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In contrast to Bearden, the Court upheld filing fee requirements in a pair of
cases where the interest at stake was lower and where the courts did not
monopolize the means to avail the interest. Thus, the Court upheld a filing fee
requirement for bankruptcy court under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause
in United States v. Kras.16° The Court ruled that an interest in bankruptcy did "not
rise to the same constitutional level" as the fundamental interest in marriage,' and
that the courts did not monopolize the interest in bankruptcy: "[ijn contrast with
divorce, bankruptcy is not the only method available to a debtor for the adjustment
162
of his legal relationship with his creditors."'
Similarly, the Court upheld a filing fee requirement to challenge a reduction of
welfare benefits under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause in Ortwein
v. Schwab.163 The Court compared the interests in Ortwein with Boddie and ruled
that welfare, like bankruptcy, had "far less constitutional significance than the
interest of the Boddie appellants."'64
b. Standards of Proof as Barriers to Court
Just as the fee cases turn on the interests at stake and the nature of the
proceedings to avail those interests, so, too, a line of cases ruling on the standard of
evidence turns on the underlying interests at stake and the nature of the proceeding.
Thus, the Court held in Addington v. Texas 6 5 that a mere "preponderance" standard
of evidence runs afoul of due process principles in a civil commitment
proceeding. 166 The Court ruled that Fourteenth Amendment Due Process demanded
a "clear and convincing" standard of proof before the state could commit an
individual against his will to a mental hospital.167 The Court's ruling turned on the
underlying interests and the nature of the proceeding to avail those interests: "[i]n
considering what standard should govern in a civil commitment proceeding, we
must assess both the extent of the individual's interest in not being involuntarily
confined indefinitely and the state's interest in committing the emotionally
68
disturbed under a particular standard of proof.'
The Court held that the interests in civil commitment proceedings involved a
"significant deprivation of liberty" and "social consequences to the individual" weighty interests that require due process protections. 69 But in rejecting the
demand for an even higher standard, "beyond a reasonable doubt," the Court
distinguished between the characteristics of a civil commitment proceeding and a
criminal trial or delinquency proceeding:

160. Kras, 409 U.S. at 446. The Court also upheld the requirement under equal protection, similarly
focusing on the interests involved. Id.
161. Id. at 444-45.
162. Id. at445.

163. 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
164. id. at 659.
165. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).

166. Id. at 427.
167. Id. at 431-33.

168. Id. at 425.
169. Id. at 425-26.
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There are significant reasons why different standards of proof are
called for in civil commitment proceedings as opposed to criminal
prosecutions. In a civil commitment state power is not exercised in a
punitive sense. Unlike the delinquency proceeding in Winship, a
can in no sense be equated to a
civil commitment proceeding
70
criminal prosecution.
In other words, while the Court considered both the underlying interests and the
nature of the proceeding in setting the standard of evidence, the Court specifically
rejected a claim for a higher standard of proof based primarily on the nature of the
proceeding. This reasoning seems to suggest that the same underlying interest the fundamental interest in liberty in a civil commitment proceeding - would
trigger the highest standard of proof, "beyond a reasonable doubt," if the nature of
the civil commitment proceeding were more complex, more adversarial, or
otherwise more like a criminal trial.
17
Building on the principle in Addington, the Court in Santosky v. Kramer 1
ruled that a mere "preponderance" standard of evidence ran afoul of due process
principles in a state-initiated proceeding to terminate parental rights. 72 The Court
focused first on the underlying interests, the fundamental interest in the right to
parent: "The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and
not been
management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have
' 73
model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.'
Through a careful comparison of interests, the Court aligned the fundamental
interest in the right to parent with the liberty interest in Addington. 74 But the Court
in Santosky was clear that these interests were somewhat lower than the interest in
physical liberty in a criminal prosecution.'7 5 At the same time, the Court
recognized that the state action in Santosky effected a permanent deprivation of the
underlying right, while civil commitment (and delinquency, deportation, and
denaturalization) were all reversible actions. 176 The net result of its exacting
and convincing"
comparison of interests was that due process demanded a "clear
77
standard in cases involving the termination of parental rights.
Finally, the Court limited the due process demand for heightened level of
proof in Rivera v. Minnich.178 The Court held that a "preponderance" standard in

170. Id. at 428 (footnote and citation omitted). In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
standard of proof in a delinquency hearing at "beyond a reasonable doubt").

368 (1970) (setting the

171. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1981).
172. Id. at 758.

173. Id. at 753.
174. Id. at 754-56.
175. Id. at 755. This conclusion is somewhat surprising given the reasoning in Addington. As
described supra, the Court in Addington seemed to reject a claim for a higher standard of proof based
primarily on the nature of the civil commitment proceeding (and not based primarily on the underlying
interest in physical liberty). Addington, 441 U.S. at 428. Aside from the relatively relaxed nature of the
civil commitment proceeding itself, nothing in Addington compels a conclusion that physical liberty in a
civil commitment proceeding is somehow different than physical liberty in, say, a criminal prosecution.
176. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759.

177. Id. at 769-70.
178. 483 U.S. 574 (1986).
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cases to establish paternity was constitutionally permissible.' 79 The Court carefully
compared the interests in a case involving "the State's termination of a fully
existing parent-child relationship" (as in Santosky) with the interests in "the legal
obligations accompanying a biological relationship between parent and child" (at
issue here).' 80 Using the same kind of careful, exacting comparison of underlying
interests that the Court used in Santosky, 18' the Court in Minnich held that the
interest in avoiding legal obligations attendant to a paternity ruling was less than
the interest in Santosky, and therefore the lower standard of evidence was
18 2
consistent with the demands of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
Thus, the priority of interests runs through the line of cases effecting access based
on the standard of proof.
B. The Priority of Equality in Process on Appeal
The appellate cases - those involving access to the appellate process and
those involving counsel on appeal - turn first on principles of equity and the type
of process (i.e., the type of appeal) in determining rights on appeal, primarily
pursuant to equal protection principles. Notably absent from these cases is the kind
of careful comparison and exacting parsing of interests that are the mainstay of the
cases at trial. Instead, the Court focuses almost exclusively on equal access within
a particular type of appeal - the priority of equality in process. This section traces
the priority of equality in process first through the access cases on appeal, then
through the counsel cases on appeal.
1. Access to the Appellate Process
The leading case on equal access on appeal is Griffin v. Illinois,'83 a case that
predates Gideon and Douglas by seven years. In Griffin, the Court ruled
unconstitutional a law that provided a free trial transcript on appeal for defendants
sentenced to death, but that required all other defendants to purchase the transcript
themselves, irrespective of their ability to pay.' 84 The effect of the statutory
classification was that defendants sentenced to death, and defendants who could
afford a transcript, would have a trial transcript on appeal; but defendants who were
not sentenced to death and who could not afford a transcript would have no trial
transcript on appeal.' 85 Despite the arguably unequal interests at stake - between
179. Id. at 579.
180. ld.

181. The Court in Minnich ruled that there were three primary differences in these interests. First,
there was an important difference in the ultimate results: a financial interest in Minnich versus a parental
interest in Santosky. Minnich, 483 U.S. at 579-80. Second, there was an important difference in the
parties' relationships in the two proceedings: a financial relationship in Minnich versus a familial
relationship in Santosky. Id. at 580-81. Finally, there was an important difference in the finality of
judgment (a consideration at play in Santosky in distinguishing Santosky and Addington, supra): a final

judgment in a paternity case bars a subsequent case on that question, but a final judgment preserving
parental rights is subject to a future new case to terminate parental rights at any time. Id. at 582.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
351 U.S. 12 (1956).
Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 14-15.
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the interest in life for those sentenced to death versus the interest in physical liberty
for all others - the Court instead focused only on the issue of equal access to
appeals. 18 6 In a strongly worded opinion, the Court ruled that in criminal trials the
state may "no more discriminate on account of poverty than on account of religion,
race, or color."'18 7 The Court found no meaningful distinction between access to
trial and access to appeal on the basis of poverty, even while recognizing that "a
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate courts or
appellate review at all."' 8t
Notably, the Court engaged in none of the discussions so carefully defining
the underlying right to physical liberty that were so central in the cases at trial. The
Court's ruling thus did not turn on the underlying interest of the litigant (here, life
and physical liberty), but rather on the right to equal access on appeal. Thus, just as
Gideon' 19 and Boddie'90 set the course to privilege the underlying right and the
nature of the proceeding in determining the scope of access in the trial cases,
Griffin' 91 set the course to privilege equality and procedure in determining the
scope of access on appeal.
Following Griffin by 10 years, the Court in Rinaldi v. Yeager 92 focused even
more narrowly on the equal protection basis of Griffin's holding, turning even less
on the magnitude of the underlying interests and more on the demand for equal
access to the appellate courts. 193 Rinaldi involved a state statutory scheme that
operated to require only those unsuccessful criminal appellants who were
imprisoned to repay the costs of a state-provided trial transcript for their appeal; all
other unsuccessful criminal appellants (i.e., those who were not imprisoned) were
not required to repay the transcript fee. 94 The underlying liberty interests in
Rinaldi were even more prominent than those in Griffin. In Rinaldi, the
classification itself treated those whose physical liberty was at stake differently
than those whose physical liberty was not. Nevertheless, the Court focused on
equality of access to the appellate courts, not the underlying interests, to rule that
the statutory scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause. 95
The Court's priority of equality in process hit its apex in Mayer v. City of
Chicago,196 which extended the Griffin and Rinaldi holdings to a case that involved
a fine, not incarceration. In Mayer, the Court held unconstitutional a state court
rule that provided trial transcripts only to those defendants appealing felony

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. at 12.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343-44.
Boddie, 401 U.S. at 376.
Griffin, 351 U.S. at 17-18.
384 U.S. 305 (1963).

193. Id. at 310.

194. Id. at 308.
195. Id. at 308-09. The Court focused on the underlying liberty interests only to the extent that the
interests themselves formed the basis of the unconstitutional classification. Thus, it was the fact of the
interests for the purpose of the classification - not the magnitude of the interests - that drove the
result. Id.
196. 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
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convictions, and not to those defendants appealing misdemeanor convictions. 197
The defendant in that case, a medical student, was convicted of disorderly conduct
and interference with police for which he was fined $500.198 Like the reasoning
and language in Griffin and Rinaldi, the opinion in Mayer is rife with references to
equal access to appeal, e.g.: "[flor 'it is now fundamental that, once established...
avenues (of appellate review) must be kept free of unreasoned distinctions that can
only impede open and equal access to the courts." ' 199

The opinion is equally bereft of reasoning and language referencing the
underlying interests of the litigant, with one single exception. In response to the
city's argument that when physical liberty is not at stake the defendant's interest in
a transcript is outweighed by the city's fiscal interest - an argument that conjures
the Mathews balancing test, 200 used in access cases at trial - the Court wrote:
We add that even approaching the problem in the terms the city
suggests hardly yields the answer the city tenders. The practical
effects of conviction of even petty offenses of the kind involved here
are not to be minimized. A fine may bear as heavily on an indigent
accused as forced confinement. The collateral consequences of
conviction may be even more serious, as when (as was apparently a
possibility in this case) the impecunious medical student finds
himself barred from the practice of medicine because of a conviction
20
he is unable to appeal for lack of funds. '
This sounds like - and has been improperly interpreted as202 - the kind of careful
parsing of underlying interests that are the mainstay of the access cases at trial. But
this alternative holding simply makes the point that the city would lose, even if the
Court adopted its argument based on the underlying interests. The Court's primary
response to the city's position is that the city's position on the underlying interests
was simply wrong:
[The city's] argument misconceives the principle of Griffin . . .
Griffin does not represent a balance between the needs of the
accused and the interests of society; its principle is a flat prohibition
against pricing indigent defendants out of as effective an appeal as
would be available to others able to pay their own way. 03
Thus, rather than revealing the relevance of the underlying interests at trial (as
the city would have had it), the holding and alternative holding in Mayer
underscore the priority of process over interests in the access cases on appeal.

197. Id. at 196-97.
198. Id. at 190.
199. Mayer, 404 U.S. at 193 (quoting Rinaldi, 384 U.S. at 310).
200. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35.

201. Mayer, 404 U.S. at 197.
202. See discussion on M.LB. v. S.LJ., 519 U.S. 102 (1996), infra.
203. Mayer, 404 U.S. at 196-97.
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Finally, in a pair of civil cases, the Court rounded out its approach to access on
appeal and its priority of process. The rulings in these cases - which adopt the
reasoning of the Griffin-Rinaldi-Yeager line of cases despite the variable
underlying interests at stake - underscore the priority of process over the
underlying interests in the access cases on appeal. Thus, in Lindsey v. Nonnet,204
the Court ruled that a double-bond requirement for appealing an adverse decision
under a state eviction statute ran afoul of the Equal Protection Clause. 20 5 In
analyzing the requirement, the Court made no mention of the underlying interest,
housing. Instead, the Court employed a standard equal protection test, concluding
that the requirement was simply not related to a state purpose, 20 6 and considered the
requirement's effect on equal access to the appellate process:
[The state] has automatically doubled the stakes when a tenant seeks
to appeal an adverse judgment in an [eviction] action. The
discrimination against the poor, who could pay their rent pending an
appeal but cannot post the double bond, is particularly obvious. For
them, as a practical matter, appeal is foreclosed, no matter how
meritorious their case may be. The nonindigent ..

.

appellant also is

confronted by a substantial barrier to appeal faced by no other civil
litigant in Oregon. The discrimination against [renters subject to
eviction] is arbitrary and irrational, and the double-bond requirement
20 7
... violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Similarly, in M.L.B. v. S.L.J., the Court held that a record preparation fee on
appeal of a case terminating parental rights violates the Equal Protection Clause
and the Due Process Clause. 20 8 Analyzing the aforementioned cases, the Court's
analysis focused first on equal access to appeal. But, given the lack of attention to
the underlying interests in the access cases on appeal, the M.L.B. Court took a
surprising turn and focused on the underlying interests. The Court aligned the
appellant's interest in the fundamental right to parent with the appellant's interest
in his professional prospects in Mayer and applied the Mathews balancing test to
conclude that the record preparation fee was unconstitutional. 209
Three aspects of the Court's ruling stand out against the typology and analysis
presented above. First, as a case involving access to appeal (not trial), M.L.B.
stands out as prioritizing the underlying interests. Second, in aligning the right to
parent with the putative right in Mayer, M.L.B. relies on an alternative holding in
Mayer that was never designed to drive the Court's conclusion in that case.
Instead, as discussed more fully above, the Court in Mayer only discussed the
underlying interests in order to refute the city's position that interests mattered.
The ruling was not based on the appellant's interest in Mayer;210 the interest only

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

405 U.S. 56 (1972).
Id. at 74.
Id. at 77-78.
Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 79.
M.LB., 519 U.S. at 121.
Id. at 121-22.
Mayer, 404 U.S. at 197.
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came up in the opinion to show that it was not relevant. To the extent that M.L.B.
turned on the alignment of interests, then, it is out of step with the plain holding in
Mayer. Finally, in M.LB., the Court's use of the Mathews balancing test sets it
apart from the other cases on equal access to appeal. As discussed more fully
above, the Mathews test has been used exclusively in the cases on access to trial;
the cases on access to appeal have turned instead on the principle of equal access to
appeal.
Despite the apparent dissonance between M.L.B. and the other cases on access
to appeal, however, the priority of equality in process remained intact through the
M.L.B. decision. Nowhere is this priority more clear than in the cases on the right
to counsel on appeal.
2. The Right to Counsel on Appeal
2t
The starting point for this analysis is, of course, Douglas v. California. ' The
Court in Douglas ruled as unconstitutional a state law permitting the state appellate
courts to make a determination whether to appoint counsel on appeal based on "an
independent investigation of the record and [a determination] whether it would be
of advantage to the defendant or helpful to the appellate court to have counsel
appointed."2'12 The Court turned to its analysis in Griffin and compared the right to
21 3
The court stated, "In
a transcript on appeal to the right to counsel on appeal.
For there can
indigent.
the
against
either case the evil is the same: discrimination
be no equal justice where the kind of an appeal a man enjoys 'depends on the
amount of money he has."' 214 Notably absent from the Court's reasoning and
language is any reference to the underlying interest at stake, physical liberty. Thus,
the Court wrote, "But where the merits of the one and only appeal an indigent has
as of right are decided without benefit of counsel, we think an unconstitutional line
215
has been drawn between rich and poor.
The Court's omission is particularly salient given that Douglas came down on
the same day as Gideon, the case that set the course for the Court's priority of
interests in right-to-counsel and access cases at trial. As noted above, the majority
did not even cite Gideon in its opinion. 216 It seemed to see the two cases as
representing two entirely different lines of authority rooted in two different
constitutional principles. Thus, the Court ruled on equal protection grounds:

The present case, where counsel was denied petitioners on appeal,
shows that discrimination is ... between cases where the rich man
can require the court to listen to argument of counsel before deciding
on the merits, but a poor man cannot. There is lacking that equality

211. Douglas,372 U.S. 353 (1963).
212. Id. at 355 (quoting People v. Hyde, 331 P.2d 42, 43 (1958)).
213. Id.
214. Id. (quoting Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19 (1956)).
215. Id. at 357.
216. Notably, the Gideon Court does not cite Douglas either. The decisions' lack of recognition of
each other - even as they came down the exact same day - underscores the conclusion that the Court

saw these cases as standing for two entirely different propositions: Gideon for the demand for counsel at
trial in a criminal case, and Douglas for the demand for equality of access to the appellate courts.
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demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment where the rich man, who
appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of counsel's examination into
the record, research of the law, and marshalling of arguments on his
behalf, while the indigent, already burdened by a preliminary
determination
that his case is without merit, is forced to shift for
217
himself.
The plain language and reasoning of the Court certainly does not limit the right to
counsel on appeal to criminal cases or other cases where a fundamental interest is at
stake. On the contrary, it opens the door wide for a claim of right to counsel on
appeal in any civil matter.
Eleven years after Douglas, the Court had occasion to define the scope of the
right to counsel on appeal in Ross v. Moffitt.21 The Court in that case held that the
right to counsel applied to appeals as of right, but not to discretionary appeals. 21 9
Like the opinion in Douglas, the opinion in Ross conspicuously did not define the
right with reference to the interest at stake despite the fact that, by 1974, after
Gideon and Argersinger,the right to counsel in any case where physical liberty was
at stake was well entrenched in the Court's jurisprudence. Instead, the Court
defined the scope of the right to counsel on appeal by reference to the equal access
principles articulated in Griffin and Douglas.2 0 The careful parsing in Ross had
nothing to do with the underlying rights at stake; rather, the careful parsing in Ross
was directed at process - the distinction between an appeal as of right and a
discretionary appeal.2 21 Thus, Ross, coming 11 years after Douglas and Gideon and
on the heels of Gideon's affirmation and definition in Argersinger, solidified the
priority of equality in process in the right-to-counsel cases on appeal.
Priority of equality in process was also clear in a series of opinions from the
early 1980s to the early 1990s that ruled on the right to counsel in a variety of
appeal-like contexts and bound the right to process, not interests. Thus the Court
ruled that an appellant had no constitutional right to counsel in filing a writ of
certiorari for discretionary appeal at a state high court, 222 that a prisoner had no
constitutional right to counsel in a post-conviction proceeding, 223 and that a
prisoner had no right to counsel on appeal from a state habeas trial court
judgment. 22 4 The question in each of these cases was whether the right to counsel
217. Douglas, 372 U.S. at 357-58.

218. 417 U.S. 600 (1974). The Court considered two different claims to the right to counsel on
appeal just three years after Douglas in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and Entsminger v.
Iowa, 386 US. 748 (1967). In those cases, criminal defendants claimed that, though represented in
name by counsel on appeal, the quality of representation fell short of the requirements in Douglas. In
Anders, the appellate attorney failed to file a brief; in Entsminger, the attorney waived the defendant's
right to a full transcript. Anders and Entsminger are unlike Ross in that they do not define the scope of

the right to counsel on appeal; rather, they define the quality of representation demanded by Douglas.
See also Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 395 (1985) (holding that a criminal defendant is entitled to
effective assistance of counsel on the first appeal as of right).
219. Ross, 417 U.S. at 621.

220. Id. at 606-10.
221.

Id. at 612-15.

222. Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S, 586, 587-88 (1982).
223. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987).
224. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 725 (1991).
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on appeal in Douglas and Ross extended to the type of process, or appeal, at issue.
Notably, in at least two of these cases, the interests at stake were different: Murray
v. Giarratano25 involved a death-row inmate's request for counsel in a post2 6 involved the exact same
conviction proceeding, while Pennsylvania v.Finley1
request for a prisoner not on death row. Nevertheless, the Court in each of these
cases resolved the right to counsel by reference to the process, not the interests.
Thus, like Douglas and Ross, these cases turned on principles of equality and
questions of process, not on the underlying interests at stake.
Finally, and most recently, the Court, in Halbert v. Michigan,227 ruled
unconstitutional a state judge's denial of appointed counsel to an indigent appellant
who had pleaded nolo contendere at trial.228 The judge, like several other judges in
the state, had routinely denied appointed counsel on appeal to similarly situated
appellants on the basis of a 1994 state constitutional amendment that provided that
any appeal by an appellant who pleaded not guilty or nolo contendere at trial was
discretionary.2 29 The amendment thus denied this class of appellants an appeal as
to these
of right, which was otherwise available under state law, and, according 23
0
Ross.
under
appeal
on
counsel
appointed
judges, also denied them a right to
Like the Court in the other decisions on right to counsel on appeal, the Halbert
Court again focused first on principles of equity and process in holding that the
denial of counsel violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Although
the Court acknowledged and affirmed the approach in M.L.B., the plain language of
the opinion reads like a Ross-like parsing of the stages of appeal, not the careful
comparison of interests in the cases on access and counsel at trial. Thus, the Court
thoroughly reviewed the appellate procedure in Michigan and attempted to align
the procedure set out in the constitutional amendment with the procedure in either
Douglas or Ross. The Court concluded, "Petitioner Halbert's case is framed by two
prior decisions of this Court concerning state-funded appellate counsel, Douglas
and Ross. The question before us is essentially one of classification: with which of
those decisions should the instant case be aligned? We hold that Douglas provides
the controlling instruction. ' 2 3' This process-based comparison is nothing like the
comparisons of interests in the cases at trial.
Moreover, the Court's inattention to the underlying interest in Halbert is
illustrated by the fact that the underlying interest in Halbert is in fact different than
the underlying interests in Douglas and Ross. The interest in Halbert is a physical
liberty interest that in some important sense had been affirmatively relinquished by
In other words, the defendant's
the defendant through his plea at trial.
by
his
own act. It does not matter for
incarceration in Halbert was brought on
constitutional purposes that Halbert received a longer sentence than he anticipated
under his plea, for the Court has clearly ranked any deprivation of physical liberty,
irrespective of length, as triggering a fundamental interest. That is, Halbert's

225.
226.
227.
228,
229.
230.
231.

Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989).
481 U.S. 551 (1987).
125 S. Ct. 2582 (2005).
Id. at 2587.
Id. at 2585.
Id. at 2586.
Halben, 125 S. Ct. at 2590 (2005).
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interest in physical liberty did not somehow increase when he unexpectedly
received a longer sentence than he anticipated; for constitutional purposes, it
remained the same - an interest that he had affirmatively relinquished. In
contrast, the physical liberty interest in Douglas and Ross was an interest that the
defendants in those cases only relinquished involuntarily, by contesting the charges
against them in a criminal trial.
A court preoccupied with the underlying interests - like the Court in any case
ruling on access or the right to counsel at trial - would certainly have examined
these interests carefully. In fact, the Court did consider carefully the volitional
nature of the relinquishment of an underlying right in Bearden.2 32 As discussed
supra, the Court in Bearden distinguished between the actual probationer in the
case, who was unable to pay a fine as a condition of continued probation (and thus
to avoid incarceration), and a counter-factual probationer, who simply choose not
to pay the same fine (and thus to subject himself to incarceration). 233 The Court
for his failure to pay the
ruled that the former probationer could not be imprisoned
234
fine, while the latter probationer could be imprisoned.
The Court's consideration of the volitional nature of the act in Bearden says
nothing necessary about the interests in Halbert. Rather, it only serves to illustrate
that the Court does engage in very careful parsing of the underlying interests at trial
- even to the point of considering their volitional nature. That the Court did not
engage in such parsing in Halbert illustrates the lack of attention the Court gives to
the underlying interests when considering the right to counsel on appeal.
Whether we examine the Court's actual language and reasoning in Halbert, or
whether we consider the Bearden-like analysis that is notably not there, one thing is
clear: Halbert continues and buttresses the priority of equality in process in the
cases on the right to counsel on appeal.
The Court's priority of equality in process on appeal, and its priority of
interests at trial, means that a more direct path to a categorical constitutional right
to counsel just may be through a Civil Douglas claim to right to counsel on a first
appeal as of right, not a Civil Gideon claim to right to counsel at trial. Because of
the priority of equality in process on appeal, a Civil Douglas claim would avoid the
careful parsing and exacting comparisons of rights that are the mainstay of those
access and right-to-counsel claims at trial. More importantly, a Civil Douglas
claim would altogether avoid the "Lassiterpresumption" that privileges the interest
in physical liberty above all else. Instead, a Civil Douglas claim would focus on
equal access and the protected process (i.e., the first appeal as of right) - factors
more amenable to a claim based on an underlying interest in, say, the right to
parent.
To be sure, the cases on the right to counsel on appeal have all, as a matter of
fact, dealt with some variation on the underlying interest in physical liberty. While

232. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668-69 (1983).

But see Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654,

658 (2002) (holding that the right to counsel at trial attached whenever a sentence of probation might
lead to an actual deprivation of liberty - as when a probation violates the terms of probation and is thus
subject to incarceration - notwithstanding the fact that a probation violation is volitional, in some
meaningful sense).
233. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 668-69.

234. Id. at 672.
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that interest has not been a turning point in those cases, as discussed supra, litigants
claiming a right to counsel on appeal would do well to demonstrate a fundamental
interest (such as the right to parent), even as their claim would not turn on that
interest.
III. CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL ON APPEAL CASES
Civil Douglas claims have some limited history, but the mere handful of
rulings has yielded decidedly mixed results. But perhaps because these cases have
all preceded M.L.B. and the Court's conglomerated analysis, these cases rely on
reasoning somewhat at odds with the approach in M.L.B. and with the typology set
out in the previous section.
For example, the court in In re Joseph T 235 held that appellants had no
constitutional right to counsel on appeal of an order depriving them of their
parental rights. 236 This decision - nine years before the Court ruled in Lassiter
that a right to counsel at a criminal trial may also apply at a civil trial 237 - turned
on the distinction between criminal and civil appeals and ruled that the right to
counsel on appeal did not attach to civil appeals.23 Similarly, the courts in In re
Sade C.,239 which came down 14 years after Lassiter, ruled that appellants had no
constitutional right to counsel on appeal of an action terminating parental rights. 24°
The New Hampshire Supreme Court in State v. Westover 24t incorrectly combined
principles from Gideon and Douglas to conclude that an appellant who received a
fine, but no loss of physical liberty, had no constitutional right to counsel on
appeal. 242 This reading of Gideon and Douglas is rather surprising in 1995, when
Westover came down, given the distinct doctrinal evolutions in those cases since
1963 and given the Lassiter ruling that the right to counsel may attach in certain
243
civil cases.
Notably, these cases denying the right have relied upon an unduly narrow
interpretation of Douglas - that the right to counsel on appeal attaches only to
criminal appeals, where physical liberty is at stake. This interpretation cuts against
the typology of holdings and reasoning set out supra: it privileges questions of
interests on appeal, where the Court has instead privileged questions of equality
235. In re Joseph T., 25 Cal. App. 3d 120 (1972).
236. Id. at 126.
237. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25-27.
238. In re Joseph T., 25 Cal. App. 3d at 126 ("We view a proceeding to adjudicate the dependency
status of a child as a true civil cause, comparable in essentials to a child custody controversy between

parents, except that the controversy is not between parents but one between a parent (or parents) and the
state as parens patriae.")(quoting In re Robinson, 8 Cal. App. 3d 783, 785-86 (1970)).
239. 13 Cal. 4th 952 (1996).
240. In re Sade C., 13 Cal. 4th at 981-93 (The issue in In re Sade C. was whether appellants had a
right under Anders to a particular quality of representation on appeal. The court answered this question

in the negative, based on its holding that an appellant in a civil action had no constitutional right to
counsel on appeal at all.).

241. 666 A. 2d. 1344 (N.H. 1995).
242. Id. at 1347 ("We conclude that, because a defendant facing no loss of liberty does not have a
right to appointed counsel at trial, he does not have such a right at the appellate level, where the
constitutional concerns are lessened.").
243. Lassiter,452 U.S. at 25-27.
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and process. But this interpretation also cuts against a fundamental principle of
Lassiter, that a right to counsel originally defined by the interest in the fundamental
right to physical liberty (or limited to the criminal context) may, under certain
circumstances, also apply to similarly weighty interests (or to weighty civil
244
cases).
In contrast, the court in Reist v. Bay County Circuit Judge245 ruled that an
indigent parent was entitled to appointed counsel in appealing a denial of parental
rights. 246 The Reist court analyzed the issue with primary reference to the
principles in Douglas and Ross, as well as the procedure-based definition that those
- an approach that is more consistent
cases gave to the right to counsel on appeal
247
with the typology of cases set out supra.
This line of state court cases is not tremendously helpful in predicting the
success of a Civil Douglas claim for two reasons. First, the rulings are inconsistent,
and they are based on different interpretations of the Court's right-to-counsel cases.
But more importantly, all of these cases precede the Court's articulation of its
conglomerated equal protection-due process approach in M.L.B. and the affirmation
of that approach in Halbert. If Lassiter left any doubt, M.L.B. and Halbert
conclusively destroyed any civil-criminal dichotomy in access and right-to-counsel
cases. After these cases, it is simply clear that neither access nor right to counsel
turns on the civil-criminal dichotomy.
Instead, as described above, the trial cases turn on the priority of interests, and
the appellate cases turn on the priority of equality in process. Based on these
trends, the Court is more likely to grant a civil right to counsel on appeal, where the
cases turn on principles of equality and process, than a civil right to counsel at trial,
where the cases turn on the underlying interests. Thus, the doctrinal path to Civil
Douglas is clearer and better paved than the path to Civil Gideon.
CONCLUSION

Civil Douglas, as a constitutional theory toward the right to appointed counsel
in civil cases, is but one piece of a much larger, more diverse Civil Gideon
movement. But to the extent that a portion of that movement continues to litigate
with the hopes that state or federal courts will someday overturn Lassiterjust as the
Court overturned Betts forty six years ago, Civil Douglas offers the doctrinal path
of least resistance toward our ultimate goal: that poor litigants in civil actions will
have a categorical constitutional right to appointed counsel.

244. Id.
245. Reist v. Bay County Circuit Judge, 241 N.W.2d 55 (Mich. 1976).

246. Id. at 64.
247. Id. at 59-64.
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